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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 








Lawrence Gold Esq. 
P.O. Box 269 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Monticello, New York 12701 
12-145-18 B 
December 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Be.rliner, Shapiro,_ Drake 
Appellant's Briefreceived July 5, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unifs Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
rsigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated; remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statem~nt of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Irunate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ii/).{~/; q . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
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APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Tolbert, Daryl DIN: 91-A-9476  
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   Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant stabbing the victim to death 
while she was holding their 15 month old baby in her arms. Appellant raises the following issues: 
1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the 
Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision lacks 
detail. 3) the Board has resentenced him to life without parole. 4) no aggravating factors exist. 5) 
the decision lacks any future guidance. 6) the decision is the same as prior decisions. 7) the Judge 
and DA letters were illegally withheld from him. 8) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 
amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was ignored, the COMPAS departure was 
void, and the statutes and regulations are forward and rehabilitation based. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
   Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Tolbert, Daryl DIN: 91-A-9476  
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.:  12-145-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 2 of 6) 
 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017);  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
   The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Delrosario 
v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry plans in 
case immigration does not deport inmate); Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec. Dep’t 
Div. of Parole Appeals Unit, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate release 
plan). 
   The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
   The Board may consider the sentencing court’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 168 A.D.3d 1342, 92 N.Y.S.3d 482 (3d Dept. 2019) 
(Board properly considered sentencing minutes which included court’s recommendation against 
parole); Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 
(3d Dept. 2017) (same); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 
2009); Matter of Delman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 93 A.D.2d 888, 461 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 
(2d Dept. 1983).    
    The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 
21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 
30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765  (3d Dept. 2006). 
    The Board may consider the inmate’s prior fleeing the area after the commission of his crime. 
Larmon v Travis, 14 A.D.3d 960, 787 N.Y.S.2d 918 (3d Dept 2005).   
   The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
      The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Tolbert, Daryl DIN: 91-A-9476  
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.:  12-145-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 3 of 6) 
 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
      Nothing in the Board’s decision indicates a permanent denial of parole consideration. Hodge v 
Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333 (SDNY 2014). 
   An inmate has no right to the letter from the District Attorney or the sentencing Judge to the 
Parole Board. Grigger v New York State Division of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689 
(3d Dept. 2004);  Matter of Ramahlo v Bruno, 273 A.D.2d 521, 708 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dept. 2000)  
lv. den. 95 N.Y.2d 767 (2000); Mingo v New York State Division of Parole, 244 A.D.2d 781, 666 
N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dept. 1997). An inmate has no constitutional right to the information in his 
parole file, Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976), and generally 
is not entitled to confidential material, Matter of Justice v. Comm’r of New York State Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Perez v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of 
Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000).  The Board may 
consider confidential information.  Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board may designate certain parole records 
as confidential. See Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) 
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(citing Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a), (f); Executive Law § 259-k(2); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a), (b)). 
   Appellant objects to the fact that the Board decision is based on the same reasons given after his 
last appearance before the Board.  However, as the Board is required to consider the same statutory 
factors each time an inmate appears, it follows that the Board may deny release on the same 
grounds as relied upon in previous determinations.  Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 
754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); see also Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 110, 
854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008) (affirming parole 
decision, which was worded similarly to two prior denials of parole affirmed by court). 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
  Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
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   The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The 
Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of Montane v. 
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 
27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).  Indeed, the 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should 
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be released.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 
A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amended regulation was intended to increase 
transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board 
departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 
2.   
 
   The Board did depart from the COMPAS in compliance with the regulation. The Board cited in 
the decision inadequate release plans, and DA and sentencing court opposition, as reasons for the 
denial. These reasons are not measured by the COMPAS document.  
 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
